Comparison Overview
Princess Cruises

Princess Cruises
1510 SE 17th St, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, US, 33316
Last Update: 19/09/2026
Princess is the world’s leading premium cruise line operating a fleet of modern ships visiting over 380 destinations around the globe on more than 160 itineraries. Each moment on Princess is one of wonderful discovery where guests can relax and explore. The choices are ...

Enterprise Mobility
600 Corporate Park Drive, St. Louis, Missouri, US, 63105
Last Update: 19/09/2026
At Enterprise Mobility™ we are paving a new way forward by creating better experiences for how we move. We give people around the world the ability to connect in ways that suit their unique needs. It’s a bold idea that has defined our purpose-led, people-first organizat...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Princess Cruises







Enterprise Mobility






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Travel Arrangements Industry Avg (This Year)
Princess Cruises has 10.31% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Travel Arrangements Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Enterprise Mobility in 2026.
Incident History - Princess Cruises (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Princess Cruises cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Enterprise Mobility (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Enterprise Mobility cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Princess Cruises

Enterprise Mobility
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.