Comparison Overview
PPS Professional Personnel Services

PPS Professional Personnel Services
1420 E Joppa Rd, Towson, 21286, US
Last Update: 03/04/2026
PPS Professional Personnel Services provides a comprehensive range of staffing options for every segment of Information Technology, Engineering, and Operations. We can deliver quality people in a timely manner. We fill contractual, temp to perm, and permanent openings. ...

Randstad USA
3625 Cumberland Park, Blvd, Atlanta, GA, US, 30339
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Randstad North America, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Randstad N.V., the world's largest HR services provider. Driven to become the world's most valued 'working life partner', supporting as many people as possible in realizing their true potential throughout thei...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

PPS Professional Personnel Services







Randstad USA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PPS Professional Personnel Services in 2026.
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Randstad USA in 2026.
Incident History - PPS Professional Personnel Services (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PPS Professional Personnel Services cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Randstad USA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Randstad USA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

PPS Professional Personnel Services

Randstad USA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.