PowerSchool Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (POW3992039111925)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the PowerSchool breach identified under incident ID POW3992039111925.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of PowerSchool's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/powerschool-group-llc, the number of followers: 150832, the industry type: E-Learning Providers and the number of employees: 3508 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 785 and after the incident was 666 with a difference of -119 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on PowerSchool and their customers.

Ontario Provincial School Systems recently reported "PowerSchool Data Leak Affecting Canadian Provincial School Systems", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Two Canadian provincial governments (Ontario and Alberta) released investigative findings blaming school systems for the massive PowerSchool data leak, which exposed data of over 62 million students and 9 million teachers.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting PowerSchool student information systems, and exposing student records (back to 1985), teacher records and special education records, with nearly 71 million (62 million students + 9 million teachers) records at risk.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, and stakeholders are being briefed through regulatory press releases (Ontario/Alberta commissioners).

The case underscores how completed (regulatory investigations by Ontario and Alberta), teams are taking away lessons such as Importance of contractual security/privacy provisions with third-party vendors, Need for multifactor authentication (MFA) as standard protocol and Criticality of limiting and monitoring remote access by vendors, and recommending next steps like Review and renegotiate agreements with PowerSchool to include robust privacy/security provisions, Implement systems to effectively oversee PowerSchool’s security program and Limit remote access to student information systems to 'as long as necessary' for technical issues, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering regulatory recommendations issued to school systems.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including exploited PowerSchool’s lack of multifactor authentication (MFA), and unrestricted remote access for support personnel and External Remote Services (T1133) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exploited remote access vulnerabilities, and unrestricted remote access for support personnel. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) implies potential credential reuse/exposure. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating schools lacked contractual security provisions, failed to monitor PowerSchool’s safeguards. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including exposed sensitive data of over 62M students/9M teachers, and records dating back to 1985—special education and disciplinary files. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including data exfiltration such as yes, and exploited remote access vulnerabilities implies use of legitimate but unsecured channels. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (10%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of destruction, but high-risk PII exposure and Cloud Service Dashboards: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation (T1538.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating lack of MFA requirements enabled unauthorized access via cloud dashboards. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.