Comparison Overview
Powerhouse Retail Services Inc.

Powerhouse Retail Services Inc.
6155 Belgrave Road, Mississauga, L5R 4E6, CA
Last Update: 09/03/2026
Powerhouse Retail Services is a professional Retail Service Company with a proven record of world class execution. We are experts in Third Party Logistics, Vendor Managed Inventory and Retail Merchandising. Our 300 strong, nationwide service force gives you the rare opp...

bnode
Boulevard Anspach 1, Brussels, Brussels Region, BE, 1000
Last Update: 02/04/2026
bnode (formerly bpostgroup) is a digital expert in parcel logistics, active in Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific. The group operates through three business units: 3PL (soon to be paxon, with brands as Active Ants, Staci and Radial), Cross-border (working under the ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Powerhouse Retail Services Inc.







bnode






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Powerhouse Retail Services Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for bnode in 2026.
Incident History - Powerhouse Retail Services Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Powerhouse Retail Services Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - bnode (X = Date, Y = Severity)
bnode cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Powerhouse Retail Services Inc.

bnode
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.