Comparison Overview
Poundland & Dealz

Poundland & Dealz
Midland Road, Walsall, WV1 3TX, GB
Last Update: 10/03/2026
From one store in Burton-upon-Trent in 1990 to more than 650 across the UK and the Republic of Ireland today, Poundland & Dealz has developed a reputation for offering top brands and quality own-brand products at an amazing value. We sell everything from food and drink ...

IKEA
Olof Palmestraat 1, Delft, Zuid-Holland, NL, 2616
Last Update: 02/06/2026
The IKEA vision is to create a better everyday life for the many people. Our business idea is to offer well-designed, functional and affordable, high-quality home furnishing, produced with care for people and the environment. The IKEA Brand unites more than 200.000 co-...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Poundland & Dealz







IKEA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Poundland & Dealz in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
IKEA has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Poundland & Dealz (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Poundland & Dealz cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - IKEA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IKEA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Poundland & Dealz

IKEA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.