Comparison Overview
Poulos & Bennett

Poulos & Bennett
2602 E. Livingston St., Orlando, 32803, US
Last Update: 19/02/2026
In March 2009, partners R. Lance Bennett, P.E. and Jamie T. Poulos, P.E., LEED A.P. perceived the need for a company that, while armed with the experience and expertise to develop sound land development projects, also fosters a culture of service in which all team membe...

AECOM
13355 Noel Road, Suite 400, Dallas, Texas, US, 75240
Last Update: 01/04/2026
AECOM is the global infrastructure leader, committed to delivering a better world. As a trusted professional services firm powered by deep technical abilities, we solve our clients’ complex challenges in water, environment, energy, transportation and buildings. Our team...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Poulos & Bennett







AECOM






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Poulos & Bennett in 2026.
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AECOM in 2026.
Incident History - Poulos & Bennett (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Poulos & Bennett cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - AECOM (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AECOM cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Poulos & Bennett

AECOM
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.