Comparison Overview
PostNL

PostNL
Waldorpstraat 3, Den Haag, 2521 CA, NL
Last Update: 26/07/2026
Welcome! We are PostNL. Your favorite delivery service is what we want to be. Every day, over 35,000 colleagues work hard to achieve this goal, on your streets and in your neighborhood, in our sorting centers and depots, and at the office. On an average day, we deliver ...

DHL Supply Chain
Charles-de-Gaulle-Str. 20, Bonn, 53113, DE
Last Update: 02/04/2026
As the world’s largest contract logistics specialist, we create competitive advantage for customers through customized logistics solutions based on globally standardized warehousing, transportation and integrated services components. We bring sector expertise, global sc...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

PostNL







DHL Supply Chain






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PostNL in 2026.
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DHL Supply Chain in 2026.
Incident History - PostNL (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PostNL cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - DHL Supply Chain (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DHL Supply Chain cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

PostNL

DHL Supply Chain
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in Rizwan17 inventory-management-system up to bfe78a330d01bb26b9daec5dc9ecd5c77900e03f. This affects an unknown part of the file includes/invoice_bill.php of the component Invoice Generation. Such manipulation of the argument order_date/invoice_no leads to missing authentication. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. This product takes the approach of rolling releases to provide continious delivery. Therefore, version details for affected and updated releases are not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in Rizwan17 inventory-management-system up to bfe78a330d01bb26b9daec5dc9ecd5c77900e03f. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file includes/DBOperation.php of the component List Handler. This manipulation of the argument category_name/brand_name/product_name causes cross site scripting. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Authentication Bypass via Hardcoded Master Verification Code vulnerability in Siam Ordering (siam-server) 1.0.0 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to log in as any user, merchant, or administrator.
The Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP receive handler bt_l2cap_br_recv() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c dispatched inbound data PDUs based only on the destination channel ID, without checking that the target channel had reached the BT_L2CAP_CONNECTED state. A dynamic channel is assigned its RX CID and added to the connection's channel list while still in BT_L2CAP_CONNECTING (and later BT_L2CAP_CONFIG) — before configuration completes and, for PSMs that require security, before the peer is authenticated (l2cap_br_conn_req()). Because the channel is already findable by bt_l2cap_br_lookup_rx_cid() during this window, a remote peer within radio range can send a data PDU addressed to that CID and have it processed on a not-yet-established channel. The dispatch keys off channel fields (BR_CHAN(chan)->rx.mode, rx.mps) that are only initialized during configuration by l2cap_br_conf(); since channel objects are pooled and bt_l2cap_br_chan_del() does not reset rx.mode or the reassembly buffer _sdu, a reused channel can carry stale state into the CONNECTING window and route the frame into the retransmission/flow-control path (bt_l2cap_br_ret_fc_recv()) with stale parameters and a possibly stale _sdu pointer. The impact is delivery of attacker data to upper-layer protocol handlers on a half-open (and possibly unauthenticated) channel, plus operation on stale or partially initialized channel state on reused channel objects — leading to channel/link teardown (denial of service) and, in the stale-_sdu case, a dangling-pointer condition. The fix adds an explicit BR_CHAN(chan)->state < BT_L2CAP_CONNECTED guard that drops any data received before the channel is fully connected.
Pandora contains a path traversal vulnerability in its archive extraction worker. When processing a specially crafted archive or disk image, attacker-controlled file paths could be used without ensuring that the resulting destination remained within the intended extraction directory. An attacker able to submit a malicious file for analysis could use path traversal sequences or crafted paths to cause extracted content to be written outside the designated extraction directory, potentially overwriting files accessible to the Pandora worker process. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized modification of application or system files, denial of service, and potentially further compromise depending on the permissions of the Pandora process and the files that can be overwritten. The vulnerability is addressed by resolving each extraction destination path before writing and verifying that it remains below the expected extraction directory. Extraction attempts resolving outside this directory are rejected and reported as path traversal attempts.