Comparison Overview
Post Office Ltd

Post Office Ltd
100 Wood Street, London, EC2V 7ER, GB
Last Update: 05/09/2026
We’ve come a long way since it all started over 380 years ago. We’ve built up a network of 11,500 branches across the country. To give you a sense of how big that is, we’ve got more branches than the four biggest banks in the UK put together. Or put simply, we’re the ...

Kroger
1014 Vine Street, Cincinnati, 45202, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
At Kroger, we believe no matter who you are or how you like to shop, everyone deserves affordable, easy-to-enjoy, fresh food. This idea is embodied in our simple tagline—Fresh for Everyone™. Kroger ranks as one of the world’s largest retailers. We are nearly half a m...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Post Office Ltd







Kroger






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Post Office Ltd in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kroger in 2026.
Incident History - Post Office Ltd (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Post Office Ltd cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Kroger (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kroger cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Post Office Ltd

Kroger
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.