Comparison Overview
Port Plastics

Port Plastics
15317 Don Julian Road, City of Industry, CA, 91745, US
Last Update: 26/01/2026
Port Plastics A leader in plastics distribution with branches across the US, Port Plastics offers an extensive portfolio of rod, plate, and tube for machining and fabrication. From olefins and transparent sheet to imidized and fluorinated engineering materials, Po...

Berry Global, Inc.
101 Oakley Street, Evansville, IN, US, 47710
Last Update: 08/09/2026
Berry Global, Inc. has merged with Amcor as of April 30, 2025. As a global leader in packaging solutions for consumer and healthcare products, our industry-leading innovation capabilities, global scale and technical expertise help our customers grow and meet the needs...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Port Plastics







Berry Global, Inc.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Plastics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Port Plastics in 2026.
Incidents vs Plastics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Berry Global, Inc. in 2026.
Incident History - Port Plastics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Port Plastics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Berry Global, Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Berry Global, Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Port Plastics

Berry Global, Inc.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.