Comparison Overview
Plessey

Plessey
N/A
Last Update: 21/02/2026
Welcome to Plessey, a leading solution provider focused on the planning, building and support of innovative ICT infrastructure across Africa. Since starting out in 1917, Plessey has continually adapted to meet the changing needs of our clients. Over nearly a century...

SFR
16, Rue du Général Alain de Boissieu, Paris, 75015, FR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
SFR is the number one alternative telecoms operator in France. SFR is also an operator providing a comprehensive range of services meeting the expectations of private and business customers alike, offering them the best of the digital world. At year-end 2011, the total ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Plessey







SFR






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Plessey in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SFR in 2026.
Incident History - Plessey (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Plessey cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SFR (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SFR cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Plessey

SFR
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.