Comparison Overview
PING AN

PING AN
No. 5033 Yitian Road, Futian District, Shenzhen, 518046, CN
Last Update: 15/09/2026
This is the official Company Page of Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. (HKEx: 2318; SSE: 601318; ADR: PNGAY). Ping An strives to become a world leading technology-powered financial services group. We believe the way people receive financial services an...

Westpac Group
275 Kent St, Sydney, 2000, AU
Last Update: 05/09/2026
From rescue helicopters to signing the Equator Principles, from paying super during parental leave to adding 'Touch ID' biometric technology to our banking apps and being first on the scene with a helping hand in times of crisis... we have a proud history of stepping u...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

PING AN







Westpac Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PING AN in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
Westpac Group has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - PING AN (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PING AN cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Westpac Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Westpac Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

PING AN

Westpac Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.