Comparison Overview
Pilot Flying J

Pilot Flying J
5508 Lonas Rd., Knoxville, 37909, US
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Company Overview Headquartered in Knoxville, Tennessee, Pilot Flying J is the largest operator of travel centers in North America with more than 750 locations throughout the United States and Canada and employs more than 24,000 Team Members. Pilot Flying J services over...

PT Lion Super Indo
Jl. Jendral Gatot Soebroto Kav. 71 - 73, Pancoran, Jakarta, 12870, ID
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Sejak tahun 1997, Super Indo telah bertumbuh dan berkembang di Indonesia melalui kemitraan bersama Ahold Delhaize yang berasal dari Belanda dan Salim Group dari Indonesia. Didukung lebih dari 10,000 karyawan* yang terlatih, Super Indo berhasil menyediakan berbagai macam...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Pilot Flying J







PT Lion Super Indo






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Pilot Flying J in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PT Lion Super Indo in 2026.
Incident History - Pilot Flying J (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Pilot Flying J cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PT Lion Super Indo (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PT Lion Super Indo cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Pilot Flying J

PT Lion Super Indo
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.