Comparison Overview
Phillips 66

Phillips 66
2331 Citywest Blvd, Houston, Texas, US, 77042
Last Update: 24/09/2026
As a leading integrated downstream energy provider, we power the operations that keep life moving forward. Our products enable a world that never quits and can’t afford to slow down. For everyone with a plan and the drive to make it happen, we Bring the Go.

TotalEnergies
2, place Jean Millier - La Défense 6, Paris La Défense Cedex, 92078, FR
Last Update: 04/09/2026
Have you ever thought of offering your skills and expertise to a multinational company? Give your best to better energy and make the commitment with TotalEnergies. With over 500-plus professions in 130 countries, we offer high safety and environmental standards, stron...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Phillips 66







TotalEnergies






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
Phillips 66 has 56.9% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TotalEnergies in 2026.
Incident History - Phillips 66 (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Phillips 66 cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TotalEnergies (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TotalEnergies cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Phillips 66

TotalEnergies
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.