Comparison Overview
Pepsi Bottling Ventures

Pepsi Bottling Ventures
4141 Parklake Ave, Raleigh, 27612, US
Last Update: 28/03/2026
Who We Are We are jointly owned by Suntory and PepsiCo. Suntory is a family-owned business founded in Japan more than 125 years ago that is known globally for their beverages and innovative spirit. PepsiCo has a 125-year plus legacy as a global leader in convenient food...

Nestlé
Av. Nestlé 55, Vevey, CH, 1800
Last Update: 06/09/2026
As the world’s largest food and beverage company we are driven by a simple aim: unlocking the power of food to enhance quality of life for everyone, today and for generations to come. To deliver on this, we serve with passion, with a spirit of excellence, offering produ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Pepsi Bottling Ventures







Nestlé






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Pepsi Bottling Ventures in 2026.
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Nestlé in 2026.
Incident History - Pepsi Bottling Ventures (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Pepsi Bottling Ventures cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Nestlé (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Nestlé cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Pepsi Bottling Ventures

Nestlé
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.