Comparison Overview
Payment Source
Payment Source
365 Evans Avenue, Suite 301, Toronto, ON, CA, M8Z 1K2
Last Update: 09/07/2026
Payment Source is your processor for uniquely Canadian payments. We enable money in and money out via INTERAC e-Transfer, cash and debit (in-person at 6,000 locations coast to coast) and more. By partnering with us you'll get access to new customer segments through cost...
Wells Fargo Advisors
1 North Jefferson Ave., St. Louis, 63103, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
With financial advisors serving our clients in all 50 states, Wells Fargo Advisors is headquartered in St. Louis. At the end of the day, we help our clients succeed financially. For us – our Financial Advisors and thousands of other team members – it's a commitment. It...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Payment Source
Wells Fargo Advisors
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Payment Source in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Wells Fargo Advisors in 2026.
Incident History - Payment Source (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Payment Source cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Wells Fargo Advisors (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Wells Fargo Advisors cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Payment Source
Wells Fargo Advisors
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Designate before 22.0.2, the mDNS handler performs pool-blind lookups when resolving record queries and NOTIFY requests. When two zones with the same name exist across different pools, the lookup fails with a deterministic error, causing the handler to return REFUSED for all DNS queries through that path. The _handle_notify path is exploitable via a single unauthenticated UDP packet. This is independently reachable through the cross-tenant zone overlap described in a different recent CVE, and also affects legitimate same-tenant cross-pool configurations. BIND9 views do not mitigate this issue as mDNS is a shared service upstream of any view configuration.
In OpenStack Designate before 22.0.1, zone creation checks (_is_subzone, _is_superzone, and the duplicate-zone DB constraint) are scoped to the target pool only. An authenticated user can bypass these checks by scheduling a zone to a different pool via the AttributeFilter scheduler, creating an overlapping zone that conflicts with another tenant's zone. This enables cross-tenant DNS hijack (redirecting traffic to attacker-controlled IPs) and DNS denial of service (NODATA responses). Exploitation requires a multi-pool deployment with AttributeFilter enabled in scheduler_filters, which is a non-default but documented and supported configuration for self-service tiering.
UpSnap is a wake on lan web app. Versions prior to 5.4.0 have an OS command injection vulnerability in the UpSnap’s device management functionality due to the presence of unsafe shell command template interpolation using the ip and the mac fields. User-controlled values can be inserted into the wake_cmd and shutdown_cmd templates and executed via /bin/sh -c (Linux) or cmd /C (Windows) without sanitization, resulting in an authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE). A low-privileged user with permission to create or edit devices can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the UpSnap hosted server. Version 5.4.0 patches the issue.
FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. When `secureEnabled=true`, FUXA `1.3.0-2773` still allows guest and invalid-token requests to read project, alarms, and scheduler APIs. Version 1.3.1 fixes this issue.
FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. In fuxa-server version 1.3.0, the GET /api/project endpoint exposes sensitive project configuration data to guest-context requests even when secureEnabled is enabled. Version 1.3.1 fixes the issue.