Comparison Overview
Payment Source
Payment Source
365 Evans Avenue, Suite 301, Toronto, ON, CA, M8Z 1K2
Last Update: 09/07/2026
Payment Source is your processor for uniquely Canadian payments. We enable money in and money out via INTERAC e-Transfer, cash and debit (in-person at 6,000 locations coast to coast) and more. By partnering with us you'll get access to new customer segments through cost...
Lincoln Financial
150 N. Radnor-Chester Road, Radnor, PA, US, 19087
Last Update: 08/06/2026
Lincoln Financial (NYSE: LNC) helps people to confidently plan for their version of a successful future. We focus on identifying a clear path to financial security, with products including annuities, investments, life insurance, group protection, and retirement plan ser...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Payment Source
Lincoln Financial
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Payment Source in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
Lincoln Financial has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Payment Source (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Payment Source cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Lincoln Financial (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Lincoln Financial cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Payment Source
Lincoln Financial
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/handler.go sendFile handler opened files using a cleaned path but derived the authorization filename from raw req.URL.Path, so a trailing slash could bypass .goshs ACL-file protection and block-list checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/updown.go multipart upload handler split part.FileName() on / but did not reject .., allowing an unauthenticated upload with filename .. to create a file outside the served tree. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.4, the httpserver/server.go wdGuard handled WebDAV MOVE as a write-only method and did not enforce --no-delete, allowing WebDAV clients to delete or overwrite files via MOVE with Overwrite: T. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. From 2.1.3 until 2.1.4, the sftpserver/sftpserver.go password handler used Username != "" && Password != "", so running goshs with -b 'admin:' -sftp and no -fkf left both SFTP authentication handlers unset and allowed unauthenticated file access. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.