Comparison Overview
Paper Converting Machine Company

Paper Converting Machine Company
2300 S Ashland Ave, Green Bay, WI, 54307-9005, US
Last Update: 20/01/2026
BW Converting manufactures high-performance converting machinery for the tissue, nonwovens, hygiene, printing and packaging industries under the banner of our industry-leading Paper Converting Machine Company (PCMC) brand. For more information, visit bwconverting.co...

Caterpillar Inc.
Irving, Texas, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
For 100 years, we’ve been helping customers build a better, more sustainable world. Our innovative products and services, backed by our global dealer network, provide exceptional value that helps customers succeed. With 2024 sales and revenues of $64.8 billion, Caterp...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Paper Converting Machine Company







Caterpillar Inc.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Paper Converting Machine Company in 2026.
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Caterpillar Inc. in 2026.
Incident History - Paper Converting Machine Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Paper Converting Machine Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Caterpillar Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Caterpillar Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Paper Converting Machine Company

Caterpillar Inc.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.