Comparison Overview
Panda Restaurant Group

Panda Restaurant Group
1683 Walnut Grove Ave, Rosemead, 91770, US
Last Update: 07/09/2026
Panda Restaurant Group is the global leader in Asian dining and includes Panda Express, Panda Inn, and more. Founded in 1973 by Andrew and Peggy Cherng, we are a family-owned business with more than 2,600 restaurants worldwide. Our mission is to deliver exceptional Asia...

Waffle House, Inc.
5986 Financial Dr NW, Norcross, 30071, US
Last Update: 07/09/2026
Waffle House has been serving Good Food Fast® since 1955. We started in one restaurant serving Avondale Estates, GA, and then grew into a national brand with more than 1,900 restaurants in 25 states providing career paths to 40,000 + employees. The love and devotion o...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Panda Restaurant Group







Waffle House, Inc.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Restaurants Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Panda Restaurant Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Restaurants Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Waffle House, Inc. in 2026.
Incident History - Panda Restaurant Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Panda Restaurant Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Waffle House, Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Waffle House, Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Panda Restaurant Group

Waffle House, Inc.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.