Comparison Overview
Pakistan Refinery Limited

Pakistan Refinery Limited
undefined, undefined, undefined, 74000, PK
Last Update: 31/12/2025
Pakistan Refinery Limited was incorporated in Pakistan as a public limited company in May 1960 and is quoted on the Karachi and Lahore Stock Exchanges. The Refinery has a capacity of processing 47,000 barrels per day of crude oil into a variety of distilled petroleum pr...

Oxy
Houston, 77046, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Oxy is an international energy company that produces, markets and transports oil and natural gas to maximize value and provide resources fundamental to life. The company leverages its global leadership in carbon management to advance lower-carbon technologies and produc...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Pakistan Refinery Limited







Oxy






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Pakistan Refinery Limited in 2026.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Oxy in 2026.
Incident History - Pakistan Refinery Limited (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Pakistan Refinery Limited cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Oxy (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Oxy cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Pakistan Refinery Limited

Oxy
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.