Comparison Overview
PaidWork.in

PaidWork.in
Sangam Vihar, Delhi, Delhi, IN, 110080
Last Update: 20/07/2026

OYO
9th Floor, Spaze Palazo,Sourthern Peripheral Road Sector-69, Gurugram, 122001, IN
Last Update: 12/09/2026
OYO is a global platform that aims to empower entrepreneurs and small businesses with hotels and homes by providing full-stack technology products and services that aims to increase revenue and ease operations; bringing easy-to-book, affordable, and trusted accommodatio...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

PaidWork.in







OYO






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
PaidWork.in has 37.89% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for OYO in 2026.
Incident History - PaidWork.in (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PaidWork.in cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - OYO (X = Date, Y = Severity)
OYO cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

PaidWork.in

OYO
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.