Comparison Overview
Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Pacific Gas and Electric Company
300 Lakeside Dr, Oakland, California, US, 94612
Last Update: 03/09/2026
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, incorporated in California in 1905, is one of the largest combination natural gas and electric utilities in the United States. Based in San Francisco, the company is a subsidiary of PG&E Corporation. There are approximately 20,000 em...

Xcel Energy
401 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, US
Last Update: 03/09/2026
A leading energy provider, dedicated to excellence. We make energy work better for our customers, helping them thrive every day. That means always raising the bar - delivering better service and providing more reliable, resilient and sustainable energy to the eight stat...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Pacific Gas and Electric Company







Xcel Energy






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Utilities Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Pacific Gas and Electric Company in 2026.
Incidents vs Utilities Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Xcel Energy in 2026.
Incident History - Pacific Gas and Electric Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Pacific Gas and Electric Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Xcel Energy (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Xcel Energy cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Xcel Energy
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.