Comparison Overview
Orange Jordan

Orange Jordan
Amman, Boulevard Al-Abdali - Black Iris St. Central 1&2, JO, P.O.Box 1689, Amman 11118
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Orange Jordan is a subsidiary of the global telecom giant Orange, which operates in 26 countries around the world in Europe, the Middle East & Africa. As a leading operator in the Kingdom, Orange Jordan offers a comprehensive lineup of fixed, mobile, internet, and dat...

Grupo Televisa
Vasco de Quiroga 2000, Distrito Federal, MX
Last Update: 20/09/2026
Televisa es una gran corporación de telecomunicaciones que posee y opera una de las compañías de cable más relevantes y un sistema líder de televisión de paga vía satélite en México. El negocio de cable de Televisa ofrece servicios integrales que incluyen video, servici...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Orange Jordan







Grupo Televisa






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Orange Jordan in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grupo Televisa in 2026.
Incident History - Orange Jordan (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Orange Jordan cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Grupo Televisa (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grupo Televisa cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Orange Jordan

Grupo Televisa
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.