Comparison Overview
ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES SOFTWARE LIMITED

ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES SOFTWARE LIMITED
ORACLE PARK, OFF. WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY, GOREGAON (EAST),, MUMBAI, 400063, IN
Last Update: 11/04/2026
Oracle helps banks simplify processes, innovate on demand, and drive predictive insight. Our solutions help banks bring new products to market faster, build customer-centric digital solutions, and achieve success through collaboration in an increasingly complex financia...

Vanguard
100 Vanguard Blvd, Valley Forge, 19482, US
Last Update: 05/09/2026
We are a community of 50 million who think—and feel—differently about investing. Together, we’re changing the way the world invests. For over 50 years, Vanguard has helped people pursue their financial goals with a spotlight on long-term value and low costs. We’ve mad...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES SOFTWARE LIMITED







Vanguard






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES SOFTWARE LIMITED has 45.65% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Vanguard in 2026.
Incident History - ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES SOFTWARE LIMITED (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES SOFTWARE LIMITED cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Vanguard (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Vanguard cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES SOFTWARE LIMITED

Vanguard
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.