Comparison Overview
Ooredoo Tunisie

Ooredoo Tunisie
Immeuble Zénith - Les Jardins du LAC, Tunis, TN
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Opérateur leader de téléphonie mobile en Tunisie, TUNISIANA, devenue Ooredoo le 24 avril 2014, est la filiale tunisienne du Groupe Ooredoo. Acteur essentiel du secteur des nouvelles technologies, Tunisiana s’est appuyée sur les progrès rapides de la technique pour dével...

Free
16, Rue de la Ville-l'Évêque, Paris, Île-de-France, FR, 75008
Last Update: 08/09/2026
Trublion historique des Télécoms, Free reste un opérateur pas comme les autres. Nous continuons de nous distinguer de nos concurrents par nos produits, par notre politique tarifaire ou encore par le ton employé avec nos abonnés. Cette différence a aussi construit la gr...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Ooredoo Tunisie







Free






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ooredoo Tunisie in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Free in 2026.
Incident History - Ooredoo Tunisie (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ooredoo Tunisie cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Free (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Free cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Ooredoo Tunisie

Free
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.