Comparison Overview
OneSubsea

OneSubsea
915 N Eldridge Pkwy, Houston, 77079, US
Last Update: 12/03/2026
SLB OneSubsea is the world’s leading subsea technology and solutions provider, focused on accelerating innovation to improve subsea asset performance, while increasing energy efficiency and reducing CO2 emissions. We are a joint venture backed by SLB, Aker Solutions, a...

Ecopetrol
Cra. 13 No. 36-24, Bogotá, CO, ----
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC) es la compañía más grande en Colombia y uno de los principales grupos de energía de Latinoamérica. Cuenta con más de 18.000 empleados y es responsable del 60% de la producción de hidrocarburos en Colombia. Es propietaria de las dos refinerías del Co...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

OneSubsea







Ecopetrol






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
OneSubsea has 56.9% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
Ecopetrol has 98.02% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - OneSubsea (X = Date, Y = Severity)
OneSubsea cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Ecopetrol (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ecopetrol cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

OneSubsea

Ecopetrol
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.