Comparison Overview
Oregon Health & Science University

Oregon Health & Science University
3181 SW Sam Jackson Park Rd, Portland, Oregon, US, 97239
Last Update: 30/03/2026
At OHSU, we deliver breakthroughs for better health. We're driven by the belief that better health starts with innovations in the lab, in the classroom, at the bedside and in our communities. From cancer to Alzheimer's to cardiovascular care, we collaborate every day ...

IHH Healthcare
Level 11 Block A, Pantai Hospital Kuala Lumpur, 8 Jalan Bukit Pantai, Kuala Lumpur, MY, 59100
Last Update: 19/07/2026
A world-leading multinational healthcare provider, IHH believes that making a difference starts with our aspiration to Care. For Good. Our team of 70,000 people commit to deliver greater good to our patients, people, the public and our planet, as we live our purpose ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Oregon Health & Science University







IHH Healthcare






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Oregon Health & Science University in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IHH Healthcare in 2026.
Incident History - Oregon Health & Science University (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Oregon Health & Science University cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - IHH Healthcare (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IHH Healthcare cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Oregon Health & Science University

IHH Healthcare
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In Zephyr's userspace dynamic-objects subsystem, thread_idx_alloc() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c allocated a new thread permission index from the global _thread_idx_map[] bitmap without holding lists_lock. On SMP systems, two user-mode threads invoking the k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) syscall concurrently can both observe the same low free bit, perform the same non-atomic RMW to clear it, and return the identical tidx. The two newly created K_OBJ_THREAD objects are then assigned the same thread_id, so the two user threads alias a single bit position in every kernel object's perms[] bitfield: any subsequent grant of access on a kernel object to one thread is implicitly a grant to the other, defeating userspace ACL isolation. A secondary lost-update window between the unlocked &=~BIT() in alloc and the locked |= BIT() in thread_idx_free() can also leak entries from the thread-index pool. The defect is reachable from any user-mode thread via the unrestricted __syscall k_object_alloc and is gated on CONFIG_USERSPACE, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS, and CONFIG_SMP. The flaw was introduced when the per-thread permission index was added in 2018 and is present in every release up to and including v4.4.0. Fixed by holding lists_lock across the bitmap RMW and the permissions clear (and inlining the obj_list traversal that previously took the lock itself).
OpenRemote before 1.26.2 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the console registration API that allows unauthenticated attackers to update existing console assets by supplying a known asset identifier. Attackers can overwrite push notification tokens and console metadata without authentication or ownership validation, redirecting notifications or denying delivery to legitimate consoles.
SiYuan before v3.7.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the POST /mcp kernel endpoint, which is gated only by a general auth check (model.CheckAuth) with no admin-role or read-only enforcement. This exposes 31 MCP tools, including a file tool with list/read/write/delete/rename/copy actions across the entire workspace. When the Publish server is enabled in anonymous mode (Conf.Publish.Enable=true and Conf.Publish.Auth.Enable=false), the Publish reverse proxy attaches an anonymous RoleReader JWT to proxied requests, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to reach /mcp. The attacker can read conf/conf.json to extract accessAuthCode, api.token, and cookieKey in plaintext, write arbitrary files in the workspace, and plant a plugin into data/plugins/ that executes with nodeIntegration:true and no contextIsolation on the next desktop launch, leading to administrator takeover.
ImageMagick before 7.1.2-27 contains a memory leak vulnerability in the magick command-line interface when invalid options are provided. Attackers can trigger memory exhaustion by repeatedly supplying malformed command-line arguments to consume system resources.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration. These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via sysfs. The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the subject of a number of bug reports. Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val, adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression algorithm registration. Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(), adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(), adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros. Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in ioctl-number.rst.
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/071590a44cbc38483fceb1ab943363ec26868e1b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1de076f43e64bf65fbe7280a269c70e0e60518df
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ae49dd04dbb11fb73f17f58a982dba128abe83a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6848a6e39cac44fdb7cb88f0f777df62172d1551
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4999664a5ef77bdb0c6e6b935f581ac8ce6b63a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1ea97076bd0a5196290deba172034e480646727
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8ebf008696de1ec08c90d51f94d7e40bd448be1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d237230728c567297f2f98b425d63156ab2ed17f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de2cc38489b629927910b1aeff69bba7bd5c6f1b