Comparison Overview
Odgers Canada

Odgers Canada
200 Bay Street, South Tower, Toronto, M5J 2J3, CA
Last Update: 19/01/2026
Odgers was founded in 1965. Globally we partner with clients from 59 offices in 33 countries. In Canada, we provide Executive Search, Interim Management, Professional Search, and Leadership Advisory services from our offices in Toronto, Ottawa, Montréal, Calgary, and Va...

BearingPoint
BearingPoint B.V., Amsterdam, NL-1101 BH, NL
Last Update: 05/04/2026
BearingPoint is an independent management and technology consultancy. Our roots are European, but our footprint is truly global. Transformation is our core service. We deliver value to enterprises, government organizations and NGOs. In a rapidly changing world, Bearing...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Odgers Canada







BearingPoint






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Odgers Canada in 2026.
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BearingPoint in 2026.
Incident History - Odgers Canada (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Odgers Canada cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - BearingPoint (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BearingPoint cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Odgers Canada

BearingPoint
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in GroupController::updatePermissions that allows GROUP_EDIT administrators to grant arbitrary rights to groups without verifying they hold those rights themselves. A delegated administrator can exploit this by assigning high-value permissions to a group they belong to, inheriting those rights and escalating privileges up to full administrative control.
n8n before 2.25.7 and 2.26.x before 2.26.2 contains an abstract syntax tree (AST) security validator bypass in the Python Code node. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows containing a Python Code node can bypass the validator and access the task executor module namespace. The issue only affects self-hosted instances where the Python Task Runner is enabled; where N8N_BLOCK_RUNNER_ENV_ACCESS is configured to allow it, this can disclose environment variables accessible to the task runner process.
Grav CMS before 2.0.0-beta.2 contains multiple code-execution vulnerabilities. Three unsafe unserialize() calls - in Scheduler\JobQueue, Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache, and Session - deserialize untrusted data without restricting allowed classes, enabling PHP object injection and, via a gadget chain, arbitrary code execution where an attacker controls the serialized input. Additionally, InstallCommand's git clone operation passes the branch, url, and path parameters into a shell command without escaping, allowing OS command injection via plugin/theme installation (which requires admin access). A Twig security blocklist bypass (server-side template injection) is also present. The issues are fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability within the debug.pl script that is reachable without authentication. A remote attacker can submit a specially crafted HTTP request containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate input sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges on the underlying system.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability in the ms_service.pl service, which listens on TCP port 9000 by default and accepts custom network packets to perform device actions. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted packet containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges.