Comparison Overview
NVIDIA Omniverse

NVIDIA Omniverse
2788 San Tomas Expy, Santa Clara, 95050, US
Last Update: 21/03/2026
NVIDIA Omniverse™ is a platform of APIs, SDKs, and services that enable developers to easily integrate Universal Scene Description (OpenUSD) and NVIDIA RTX™ rendering technologies into existing software tools and simulation workflows for building AI systems.

Bolt
Tallinn, EE
Last Update: 22/09/2026
At Bolt, we're building a future where people don’t need to own personal cars to move around safely and conveniently. A future where people have the freedom to use transport on demand, choosing whatever vehicle's best for each occasion — be it a car, scooter, or e-bike....
Compliance Ranges Comparison

NVIDIA Omniverse







Bolt






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NVIDIA Omniverse in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
Bolt has 0.99% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - NVIDIA Omniverse (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NVIDIA Omniverse cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Bolt (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bolt cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

NVIDIA Omniverse

Bolt
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.