In June 2017, a coordinated GPS spoofing attack disrupted the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of at least 20 commercial ships near the Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port, falsely relocating their positions to Gelendzhik Airport, 32 km inland. The attack was widely attributed to Russian electronic warfare testing, likely part of broader cyber-electronic operations to obfuscate high-profile movements (e.g., Putin’s travel routes) and protect sensitive military or governmental zones.The incident posed severe risks to maritime navigation safety, potentially causing collisions, groundings, or operational chaos in a critical shipping corridor. While no direct physical damage or data breaches were reported, the attack demonstrated vulnerabilities in global satellite navigation systems, which are foundational to transportation, logistics, and defense infrastructure. The deliberate manipulation of GPS signals—an act of state-sponsored cyber-electronic warfare—highlighted the potential for escalatory cyber-physical threats, including disruptions to supply chains, economic stability, and geopolitical tensions. The attack’s scale and precision suggested advanced capabilities in signal jamming/spoofing, raising concerns about future targeting of civilian infrastructure, military operations, or even aviation systems in contested regions.