Comparison Overview
APL

APL
N/A
Last Update: 06/12/2025
Purposeful partnership. Precision performance. Uninterrupted uptime. Our APL experts continuously develop cost-efficient designs that are fit for purpose, whilst advancing engineering philosophies to enhance our already cutting-edge technology and processes for the i...

Equinor
Forusbeen 50, Stavanger, Rogaland, NO, 4035
Last Update: 07/10/2026
We're Equinor, an international energy company with a proud history. Formerly Statoil, we are 20,000 committed colleagues developing oil, gas, wind and solar energy in more than 30 countries worldwide. We’re the largest operator in Norway, among the world’s largest offs...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

APL







Equinor






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for APL in 2026.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Equinor in 2026.
Incident History - APL (X = Date, Y = Severity)
APL cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Equinor (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Equinor cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

APL

Equinor
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.