Comparison Overview
Norton Abrasives

Norton Abrasives
1 New Bond Street, Worcester, 01606, US
Last Update: 22/12/2025
For 130+ years, Norton products have provided the right choices for grinding, cutting, blending, finishing and polishing solutions for a wide array of markets, materials and applications. The Norton brand delivers affordable innovation with the highest productivity in s...

TK Elevator
E-Plus Straße 1, Düsseldorf, North Rhine-Westphalia, DE, 40472
Last Update: 01/04/2026
𝗪𝗲𝗹𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝗧𝗞 𝗘𝗹𝗲𝘃𝗮𝘁𝗼𝗿 – 𝗪𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗻𝘂𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗘𝗹𝗲𝘃𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗨𝗿𝗯𝗮𝗻 𝗟𝗶𝘃𝗶𝗻𝗴 Engineering pioneer. Global industry leader. TK Elevator draws on a legacy of firsts – from a groundbreaking vertical conveyor in 1890 – to evolve modern ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Norton Abrasives







TK Elevator






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Norton Abrasives in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TK Elevator in 2026.
Incident History - Norton Abrasives (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Norton Abrasives cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TK Elevator (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TK Elevator cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Norton Abrasives

TK Elevator
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in David Lingren Media LIbrary Assistant allows Stored XSS. This issue affects Media LIbrary Assistant: from n/a through 3.39.
Missing Authorization vulnerability in Kings Plugins B2BKing allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects B2BKing: from n/a through 5.2.30.
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in PublishPress PublishPress Series allows Stored XSS. This issue affects PublishPress Series: from n/a through 2.17.0.
linuxfabrik-lib provides Python modules for database access, caching, shell execution, and API integrations, and Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins uses its shared testing helper across check plugins. Prior to linuxfabrik-lib 6.1.0 and Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins 7.0.0, lib.lftest.test() treated the first or second element of a --test CSV argument as a filesystem path and returned the file contents as simulated standard output or standard error without path confinement. The hidden but production-accessible --test argument was accepted by sudo-authorized plugins, so an attacker controlling the nagios or icinga account could use check-plugins/deb-updates/deb-updates with its default QUERY=1 to disclose every line of a root-readable file. Approximately 22 other plugins exposed filtered content or a root file existence and readability oracle through the same helper, while check-plugins/network-bonding/network-bonding and check-plugins/openstack-swift-stat/openstack-swift-stat had direct read paths that bypassed the helper. The library fix confines fixture reads to the invoking plugin's unit-test directory and refuses unsafe anchors, and the plugin fix routes the two bypasses through that helper. These issues are fixed in linuxfabrik-lib 6.1.0 and Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins 7.0.0.
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/lib/commit/d665042c55fae83a295ebc0023e8b77f6c473a28
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/lib/releases/tag/v6.1.0
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/commit/f6680a9e4b39569f318feefdb2f51e5d18c7dad5
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/releases/tag/v7.0.0
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/security/advisories/GHSA-rh9c-rqvg-f7pr
Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins provides monitoring plugins for Icinga, Nagios, and related systems. Prior to version 7.0.0, check-plugins/logfile/logfile accepted a free-form --filename path and opened it as root when invoked through the shipped nagios or icinga sudoers allowlist, without confining the resolved path to /var/log. An attacker who controls the monitoring account can select a root-readable file such as /etc/shadow and use --warning-regex . while leaving SUPPRESS_OUTPUT false, causing each nonempty line to be collected in warn_matches and returned through lib.base.oao(). The vulnerable flow passes the expanded scan_path directly to open(), and neither real-path containment nor an allowlist protects the sink. The same fix also confines mysql-logfile and openvpn-client-list paths, allows only documented log roots, and resolves symlinks and parent-directory traversal before checking containment. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.0.
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/ae486fc629e1ca9373e1b6dd5e395603ee453bbc/CHANGELOG.md#v700---2026-08-14
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/commit/a0ca1268d84e0caf10442b9c7477d699b52d1c92
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/releases/tag/v7.0.0
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/security/advisories/GHSA-f54c-p5vg-mr5c