Comparison Overview
NPG

NPG
512 W 22nd St, 8th Floor, New York, NY, US, 10011
Last Update: 04/04/2026
NPG is a well-established, institutional-grade, vertically-integrated commercial real estate investment firm headquartered in New York City. Founded in 2005 by Elie Schwartz and Simon Singer, NPG deploys capital on behalf of itself and its partners through specific and...

FirstService Residential
1855 Griffin Road, Suite A-330, Dania Beach, FL, US, 33004
Last Update: 01/04/2026
FirstService Residential is simplifying property management. Its hospitality-minded teams serve residential communities across the United States and Canada. The organization partners with boards, owners, and developers to enhance every property's value and every residen...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

NPG







FirstService Residential






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NPG in 2026.
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for FirstService Residential in 2026.
Incident History - NPG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NPG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - FirstService Residential (X = Date, Y = Severity)
FirstService Residential cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

NPG

FirstService Residential
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in GroupController::updatePermissions that allows GROUP_EDIT administrators to grant arbitrary rights to groups without verifying they hold those rights themselves. A delegated administrator can exploit this by assigning high-value permissions to a group they belong to, inheriting those rights and escalating privileges up to full administrative control.
n8n before 2.25.7 and 2.26.x before 2.26.2 contains an abstract syntax tree (AST) security validator bypass in the Python Code node. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows containing a Python Code node can bypass the validator and access the task executor module namespace. The issue only affects self-hosted instances where the Python Task Runner is enabled; where N8N_BLOCK_RUNNER_ENV_ACCESS is configured to allow it, this can disclose environment variables accessible to the task runner process.
Grav CMS before 2.0.0-beta.2 contains multiple code-execution vulnerabilities. Three unsafe unserialize() calls - in Scheduler\JobQueue, Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache, and Session - deserialize untrusted data without restricting allowed classes, enabling PHP object injection and, via a gadget chain, arbitrary code execution where an attacker controls the serialized input. Additionally, InstallCommand's git clone operation passes the branch, url, and path parameters into a shell command without escaping, allowing OS command injection via plugin/theme installation (which requires admin access). A Twig security blocklist bypass (server-side template injection) is also present. The issues are fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability within the debug.pl script that is reachable without authentication. A remote attacker can submit a specially crafted HTTP request containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate input sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges on the underlying system.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability in the ms_service.pl service, which listens on TCP port 9000 by default and accepts custom network packets to perform device actions. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted packet containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges.