Comparison Overview
Nidec ASI S.A.S.

Nidec ASI S.A.S.
ZI Buisson 5 r Marc Seguin, Roche la Molière, undefined, 42230, FR
Last Update: 18/01/2026
Nidec ASI S.A.S., based near Saint-Etienne (42) in France, is a company that designs, manufactures and installs Battery Energy Storage Systems. We are also active in other fields such as renewable energy, ventilation, steel industry, conveyer belts, paper mills, cement,...

Johnson Controls
Milwaukee, Cork, Ireland, IE, T12 X8N6
Last Update: 25/09/2026
At Johnson Controls, we transform the environments where people live, work, learn and play. As the global leader in smart, healthy and sustainable buildings, our mission is to reimagine the performance of buildings to serve people, places and the planet. Building on ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Nidec ASI S.A.S.







Johnson Controls






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Nidec ASI S.A.S. in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Johnson Controls in 2026.
Incident History - Nidec ASI S.A.S. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Nidec ASI S.A.S. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Johnson Controls (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Johnson Controls cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Nidec ASI S.A.S.

Johnson Controls
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.