Comparison Overview
NESCTC Security Agency, LLC

NESCTC Security Agency, LLC
46 Molter Street, Cranston, RI, 02910, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
NESCTC is a privately held, limited liability company headquartered in Cranston, RI. NESCTC works globally as a security management company providing contracted security to some of the worlds leading companies. We offer the most competitive rates and greatest cover...

Gendarmerie Nationale
4 rue Claude Bernard, Issy les Moulineaux, 92130, FR
Last Update: 21/09/2026
Force humaine de près de 100 000 hommes et femmes placée sous l’autorité du ministère de l’Intérieur, la Gendarmerie nationale est une institution militaire garante de la sécurité et de la paix de nos concitoyens, et de la protection de leurs biens. Elle assure des miss...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

NESCTC Security Agency, LLC







Gendarmerie Nationale






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Security and Investigations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NESCTC Security Agency, LLC in 2026.
Incidents vs Security and Investigations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Gendarmerie Nationale in 2026.
Incident History - NESCTC Security Agency, LLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NESCTC Security Agency, LLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Gendarmerie Nationale (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Gendarmerie Nationale cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

NESCTC Security Agency, LLC

Gendarmerie Nationale
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Dify is an open-source LLM app development platform. Prior to 1.16.0, the PUT /console/api/apps/<app_id>/server endpoint in api/controllers/console/app/mcp_server.py used AppMCPServerController.put() to retrieve an AppMCPServer by the client-supplied server ID without verifying that the server belonged to the requested application and tenant. An authenticated workspace member could therefore change another application's MCP server status and parameters, potentially redirecting data or disabling the service. This issue is fixed in version 1.16.0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.30.0, a caller can use the request-level media_io_kwargs field to select the GLMGA video backend and supply large values for the fps and max_frames options without a strict work ceiling. GLMGA constructs and deduplicates an attacker-sized pre-decode frame-index list, allowing a compact request and tiny valid video to consume disproportionate CPU time and memory in the shared media-loading executor. This issue is fixed in version 0.30.0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.30.0, the Rust frontend's track_http_metrics middleware records the raw HTTP method token as a Prometheus label for requests reaching registered routes. An unauthenticated attacker can send unique arbitrary method tokens to unguarded routes such as /tokenize, causing Prometheus's Family::get_or_create function to permanently create counter and histogram label sets. Those label sets increase process memory usage and enlarge the /metrics response until the service or monitoring path is exhausted. This issue is fixed in version 0.30.0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. From 0.24.0 until 0.30.0, the Qwen2VLVideoBackend and Qwen3VLVideoBackend classes accept request-level values for the media_io_kwargs.video.max_frames and media_io_kwargs.video.fps fields without enforcing server-side ceilings. An unauthenticated caller can submit these values to the /tokenize endpoint, causing the sampler to decode every frame selected from attacker-controlled video input, consume disproportionate frontend memory, and potentially terminate the API process before scheduling or admission control. The Rust frontend is not affected because it rejects the media_io_kwargs field. This issue is fixed in version 0.30.0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.30.0, structured-output request failures can escape request-scoped validation and reach the EngineCore fatal-error path. A per-request backend mismatch can re-raise a grammar compilation exception, padding produced by the ngram_gpu speculative-decoding mode can pass a negative token to guidance validation, and the Rust frontend can admit empty structured-output values that the Python frontend rejects, allowing ordinary constrained-generation requests to terminate the shared engine. This issue is fixed in version 0.30.0.