Comparison Overview
NESCTC Security Agency, LLC

NESCTC Security Agency, LLC
46 Molter Street, Cranston, RI, 02910, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
NESCTC is a privately held, limited liability company headquartered in Cranston, RI. NESCTC works globally as a security management company providing contracted security to some of the worlds leading companies. We offer the most competitive rates and greatest cover...

GardaWorld
2300 Émile-Bélanger, Saint-Laurent , H4R 3J4, CA
Last Update: 01/04/2026
GardaWorld is the world’s largest privately-owned security services company, offering cash services, physical and specialized security solutions, and with our Crisis24 portal, the dissemination of verified information related to international security. GardaWorld est ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

NESCTC Security Agency, LLC







GardaWorld






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Security and Investigations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NESCTC Security Agency, LLC in 2026.
Incidents vs Security and Investigations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for GardaWorld in 2026.
Incident History - NESCTC Security Agency, LLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NESCTC Security Agency, LLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - GardaWorld (X = Date, Y = Severity)
GardaWorld cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

NESCTC Security Agency, LLC

GardaWorld
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.23.1rc0, the fix for CVE-2026-22778, which introduced a sanitize_message helper that strips object-repr memory addresses from error messages before they reach the client, is incomplete: several response paths echo str(exc) directly to clients without calling sanitize_message. The unsanitized sites include the Anthropic API router in vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py (the POST /v1/messages and POST /v1/messages/count_tokens handlers), the Server-Sent Events streaming converter in vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/serving.py, and the realtime speech-to-text WebSocket in vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py. These paths catch the exception inside the route coroutine and construct the JSONResponse themselves, bypassing the sanitizing global FastAPI exception handler, and WebSocket frames do not traverse that handler chain at all. Using the same primitive as the parent issue, an unauthenticated attacker can send malformed image bytes through the Anthropic Messages API image content parts so that PIL.Image.open raises an UnidentifiedImageError whose message contains the BytesIO object repr, leaking the heap memory address verbatim in the error.message field of the response body. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.23.1rc0, ll temperature validation gates use comparison operators (<, >), which silently evaluate to False for NaN and for positive Infinity in Python's IEEE 754 float semantics. Both values pass every guard and propagate to GPU sampling kernels, where they produce undefined behavior or CUDA errors that can crash the inference worker. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.23.1rc0, vLLM's /v1/audio/transcriptions endpoint limits compressed upload size but not decoded PCM output. A 25MB OPUS file expands to ~14.9GB of float32 PCM at decode time. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.22.1, the vLLM Dockerfile is vulnerable to a dependency confusion attack through the flashinfer-jit-cache package. The package is installed from a custom index (flashinfer.ai/whl/) using --extra-index-url, but the package name was not registered on PyPI, and UV_INDEX_STRATEGY="unsafe-best-match" is set globally. An attacker who registers flashinfer-jit-cache on PyPI with version 0.6.11.post2 can execute arbitrary code as root during the Docker build and backdoor every resulting container image, enabling exfiltration of all user prompts, API credentials, and model data from production vLLM deployments This vulnerability is fixed in 0.22.1.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). From 0.5.5 until 0.23.1rc0, integer truncation of tensor dimensions in vLLM's GGUF dequantize kernels (csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu) causes partial tensor processing. The output tensor is allocated at full size via torch::empty (uninitialized memory), but the dequantize CUDA kernel processes only a truncated number of elements. The unfilled portion of the output tensor retains whatever was previously in GPU memory. In multi-tenant inference deployments, this residual GPU memory may contain tensor data from other users' inference requests, constituting information disclosure. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.