Comparison Overview
NBM Railways

NBM Railways
11 Gifford Road, Saint John, New Brunswick, E2M 4X8, CA
Last Update: 03/12/2025
NBM Railways is a group of short-line railways (New Brunswick Southern, Eastern Maine, and Maine Northern) proudly operating since 1995. Headquartered in Saint John, NB, with operations in Mattawamkeag, ME and Oakfield, ME, we maintain and operate over 550 miles/885km o...

Network Rail
The Quadrant MK, Milton Keynes, MK9 1EN, GB
Last Update: 13/09/2026
We’re at the heart of revitalising Britain’s railway, getting people and goods where they need to be and supporting the economy. Investment and modernisation are essential. So we’re building the railway of the future, running a safe, reliable and efficient railway, and...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

NBM Railways







Network Rail






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Rail Transportation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NBM Railways in 2026.
Incidents vs Rail Transportation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Network Rail in 2026.
Incident History - NBM Railways (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NBM Railways cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Network Rail (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Network Rail cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

NBM Railways

Network Rail
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.