Comparison Overview
Naval Inspector General

Naval Inspector General
Washington, D.C., US
Last Update: 18/02/2026
Official LinkedIn account of the Naval Inspector General. Our mission is to inspect, investigate or inquire into any and all matters of importance to the Department of the Navy and maintain the highest level of public confidence. Do not use this page to submit inquir...

US Navy
1200 Navy Pentagon, Washington, 20350, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
The United States is a maritime nation, and the U.S. Navy protects America at sea. Alongside our allies and partners, we defend freedom, preserve economic prosperity, and keep the seas open and free. Our nation is engaged in long-term competition. To defend American int...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Naval Inspector General







US Navy






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Armed Forces Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Naval Inspector General in 2026.
Incidents vs Armed Forces Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for US Navy in 2026.
Incident History - Naval Inspector General (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Naval Inspector General cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - US Navy (X = Date, Y = Severity)
US Navy cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Naval Inspector General

US Navy
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.