Comparison Overview
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)

NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)
Filtri tee 5, Juhkentali, 10132, EE
Last Update: 21/03/2026
The CCDCOE embodies and fosters cooperation of like-minded nations. The heart of the Centre is a diverse group of experts from 39 nations. Our mission is to support our member nations and NATO with unique interdisciplinary expertise in the field of cyber defence researc...

Amentum
4800 Westfields Blvd, 400, Chantilly, Virginia, US, 20151
Last Update: 28/03/2026
Amentum is a global leader in advanced engineering and innovative technology solutions, trusted by the United States and its allies to address their most significant and complex challenges in science, security and sustainability. Our people apply undaunted curiosity, re...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)







Amentum






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in 2026.
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Amentum in 2026.
Incident History - NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Amentum (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Amentum cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)

Amentum
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.