Comparison Overview
myInitial - Online Reporting Tool from Initial Washroom Hygiene

myInitial - Online Reporting Tool from Initial Washroom Hygiene
N/A
Last Update: 28/02/2026
myInitial is a tool for our Washroom Servicing customers, offering an improvement in the transparency of service that is being provided, including costs, dates of visits and access to reports.

Ambius United Kingdom
Rentokil Initial, Crawley, RH10 9PY, GB
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Ambius us the world's largest provider of plants, replica foliage and flowers for commercial environments. We not only specialise in designing, installing and servicing acclimatised, interior plants and pots, but also offer additional services such as exterior landsca...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

myInitial - Online Reporting Tool from Initial Washroom Hygiene







Ambius United Kingdom






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Facilities Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for myInitial - Online Reporting Tool from Initial Washroom Hygiene in 2026.
Incidents vs Facilities Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ambius United Kingdom in 2026.
Incident History - myInitial - Online Reporting Tool from Initial Washroom Hygiene (X = Date, Y = Severity)
myInitial - Online Reporting Tool from Initial Washroom Hygiene cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Ambius United Kingdom (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ambius United Kingdom cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

myInitial - Online Reporting Tool from Initial Washroom Hygiene

Ambius United Kingdom
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.