Comparison Overview
MyDrive Solutions in Members Voluntary Liquidation

MyDrive Solutions in Members Voluntary Liquidation
Unit 02.02.1 The LeatherMarket, London, undefined, SE1 3ER, GB
Last Update: 17/03/2026
The company ownership has been transferred to Generali Jeniot S.p.a in April 2020 We make driving smarter and safer through data science and software engineering. The MyDrive profiling engine analyses driving data, producing highly accurate insight into driver behavi...

Aviva
80 Fenchurch Street, London, EC3M 4AE, , GB
Last Update: 04/09/2026
💛 We're a leading Insurance, Wealth & Retirement business. 📣 Follow for #LifeAtAviva. Aviva is nothing without our people. Living up to our purpose to be with you today for a better tomorrow applies to those we work with just as much as it does to our custom...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

MyDrive Solutions in Members Voluntary Liquidation







Aviva






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MyDrive Solutions in Members Voluntary Liquidation in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Aviva in 2026.
Incident History - MyDrive Solutions in Members Voluntary Liquidation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MyDrive Solutions in Members Voluntary Liquidation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Aviva (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Aviva cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

MyDrive Solutions in Members Voluntary Liquidation

Aviva
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.