Comparison Overview
MTS Group

MTS Group
Moscow, RU
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Mobile TeleSystems OJSC ("MTS") is the leading telecommunications group in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, offering mobile and fixed voice, broadband, pay TV as well as content and entertainment services in one of the world's fastest growing regions. Including ...

Telefónica
Spain, Madrid, 28050, ES
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Telefónica is today one of the largest telecommunications companies in the world in terms of market capitalisation and number of customers. We have the best infrastructure, as well as an innovative range of digital and data services; therefore, we are favorably position...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

MTS Group







Telefónica






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MTS Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Telefónica in 2026.
Incident History - MTS Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MTS Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Telefónica (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Telefónica cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

MTS Group

Telefónica
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.