Comparison Overview
Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at AUB
Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at AUB
American University of Beirut, Beirut, Beirut, LB, P. O. Box 11-023, Riad El-Solh
Last Update: 19/02/2026
This is the official account of the Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at the American University of Beirut (AUB). -------------------------- A viable, livable, and equitable world. We are deeply vested in our communities and to leading and contrib...
The University of Texas at Austin
1 University Station, Austin, TX, US, 78712
Last Update: 02/04/2026
The University of Texas at Austin is one of the largest public universities in the United States. Founded in 1883, the University has grown from a single building, eight teachers, two departments and 221 students to a 350-acre main campus with 21,000 faculty and staff, ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at AUB
The University of Texas at Austin
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at AUB in 2026.
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for The University of Texas at Austin in 2026.
Incident History - Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at AUB (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at AUB cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - The University of Texas at Austin (X = Date, Y = Severity)
The University of Texas at Austin cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at AUB
The University of Texas at Austin
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
h2o is an HTTP server with support for HTTP/1.x, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3. Prior to commit 6b5370d, h2o is vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack when calling alloca under certain conditions. When serving static files, h2o builds the file path on stack, by calling alloca. The maximum size of the memory allocated using alloca can be as huge as ~600KB, which exceeds the default pthread stack size used by musl libc (128KB). If the amount of memory allocated by alloca exceeds the stack size, the h2o server crashes with a segmentation fault, while it tries to touch the guard page. This issue has been fixed by commit 6b5370d.
h2o is an HTTP server with support for HTTP/1.x, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3. Prior to commit 8dc37cb, when h2o receives a ClientHello message over TLS or QUIC and it contains a zero-length SNI extension, the h2o server runs over the zero-length hostname while trying to copy the hostname, assuming that it is NULL-terminated. This is a potential denial-of-service attack vector in sense that it might trigger segmentation violation. This issue has been fixed by commit 8dc37cb.
Quicly is an IETF QUIC protocol implementation intended primarily for use within the H2O HTTP server. Prior to commit 8b178e6, Quicly is vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack through connection state corruption. In QUIC Invariants, the maximum length of a Connection ID is 255 bytes, while QUIC version 1 further restricts the maximum to 20 bytes. Quicly implements QUIC version 1 and therefore its CID buffers are limited to 20 bytes. However, to be able to respond to unknown versions of QUIC, its packet decoder accepts Connection IDs of up to 255 bytes. As its CID buffers are merely 20 bytes long, Quicly must reject QUIC version 1 packets with Connection IDs longer than that. The command line tool bundled with Quicly has had that check, however the library itself lacked such enforcement. As a consequence, when used by applications that lack their own enforcement, the connection state becoming inconsistent to buffer overrun. Fortunately, the overflow stops within the allocated chunk of memory, but nevertheless, the bug leads to assertion failures. This issue has been fixed by commit 8b178e6.
Quicly is an IETF QUIC protocol implementation intended primarily for use within the H2O HTTP server. Prior to commit 937d0e9, an assertion failure is raised when the total number of valid handshake messages received over a CRYPTO stream of a single packet number space exceeds 32KB, causing a Denial of Service. This issue has been fixed by commit 937d0e9.
Quicly is an IETF QUIC protocol implementation intended primarily for use within the H2O HTTP server. Prior to commit dccf5d4, Quicly was vulnerable to stateless reset injection through lack of packet entry validation. The QUIC protocol is designed to withstand packet injection attacks, once the handshake is complete. Only packets that carry some secret patterns are considered as stateless resets. Quicly allows the peer to share up to 4 such patterns per connection. However, until now, it failed to determine which of the 4 slots that it uses to retain the secret patterns contains a valid entry. As the slots are zero-initialized, the failure meant that, unless the peer advertised 4 of such patterns, an all-zero pattern was treated as a stateless reset.In effect, this allowed an on-path attacker to reset QUIC connections governed by Quicly. This issue has been fixed by commit dccf5d4.