Comparison Overview
Moonee Valley City Council

Moonee Valley City Council
9 Kellaway Avenue, Moonee Ponds, Victoria, AU, 3039
Last Update: 01/03/2026
Are you looking for a job where you can make a real difference in the community? A workplace that provides opportunity, challenge and balance? A workplace that values your skills and professionalism? Moonee Valley is a great place to live, work and play. Our council ...

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200, Victoria Square / Tarndanyangga, Adelaide, 5000, AU
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The OFFICIAL careers page for the South Australian Government. The South Australian Public Sector is the State's largest workforce. We are an employer of choice that reflects the diverse community we serve. Our people are from a range of backgrounds and vocations, fro...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Moonee Valley City Council







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Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Moonee Valley City Council in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for I WORK FOR SA in 2026.
Incident History - Moonee Valley City Council (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Moonee Valley City Council cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - I WORK FOR SA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
I WORK FOR SA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Moonee Valley City Council

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FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.