Comparison Overview
Moltiply Group

Moltiply Group
N/A
Last Update: 18/06/2026
The new brand of Gruppo MutuiOnline, a European leader in in transparency, innovation, technology. Founded in 2000 by Alessandro Fracassi and Marco Pescarmona, the company represents a business case of a startup which became the first fintech unicorn in Italy. Listed ...

Goldman Sachs
200 West Street, New York, 10282, US
Last Update: 07/10/2026
We aspire to be the world’s most exceptional financial institution, united by our shared values of partnership, client service, integrity, and excellence. Operating at the center of capital markets, we act as one firm, mobilizing our people, capital, and ideas to deli...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Moltiply Group







Goldman Sachs






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Moltiply Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
Goldman Sachs has 0.99% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Moltiply Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Moltiply Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Goldman Sachs (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Goldman Sachs cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Moltiply Group

Goldman Sachs
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.