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Analyze » Moffatt & Nichol » MOF59100659112625

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MOF59100659112625)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-19
Company Score Before Incident761 / 1000
Company Score After Incident742 / 1000
Company LinkView Moffatt & Nichol Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERMOF59100659112625
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORFake Browser Update Pop-ups, Compromised Legitimate Websites, Malicious JavaScript Injection, Social Engineering
DATA EXPOSEDNA
INCIDENT DATE31/08/2025
STATUSCompleted (payload quarantined, no full compromise)

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Moffatt & Nichol 's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Moffatt & Nichol Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Moffatt & Nichol breach identified under incident ID MOF59100659112625.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Moffatt & Nichol 's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/moffatt-&-nicho, the number of followers: 32820, the industry type: Civil Engineering and the number of employees: 1218 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 761 and after the incident was 742 with a difference of -19 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Moffatt & Nichol and their customers.

U.S.-based civil engineering firm (unnamed) recently reported "Russian-Linked Threat Actors Use Fake Browser Updates to Deploy SocGholish Malware in Targeted Espionage Campaign", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Cybersecurity researchers at Arctic Wolf Labs uncovered a new cyberattack campaign where Russian-linked threat actors (GRU Unit 29155) used fake browser update pop-ups to deploy the SocGholish malware, marking the first known instance of the RomCom threat group using SocGholis...

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting At least one system in a U.S.-based civil engineering firm.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Aurora Endpoint Defense detected and quarantined the payload, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public disclosure by Arctic Wolf Labs and Advisories on mitigating SocGholish threats.

The case underscores how Completed (payload quarantined, no full compromise), teams are taking away lessons such as SocGholish malware-as-a-service is evolving from financially motivated attacks to state-sponsored espionage, Compromised legitimate websites pose a significant risk for initial access and Fake browser update lures remain highly effective for malware delivery, and recommending next steps like Enable PowerShell logging to detect malicious activity, Deploy Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions for real-time threat detection and Train employees to ignore unsolicited browser update prompts, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Arctic Wolf Labs public disclosure and mitigation recommendations.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating fake browser update pop-ups on compromised legitimate websites to trick employees and Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating compromised legitimate websites to inject malicious JavaScript. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating recommended such as Enable PowerShell logging to detect malicious activity and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating fake msedge.dll payload disguised as a browser update. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating romCom Mythic Agent loader (msedge.dll) (common persistence mechanism for loaders). Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Process Injection (T1055) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating socGholish malware (known to use process injection for escalation). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating advanced obfuscation techniques (e.g., obf-io), Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating payload executed only when victim’s system matched a predefined domain (selective execution to evade detection), and Hide Artifacts: Masquerading Extension (T1564.008) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating payload disguised as msedge.dll. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including established a connection to Mythic C2 servers, and monitor for connections to known Mythic C2 infrastructure (e.g., imprimerie-agp.com, ozivoice.com) and Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating mythic C2 servers (commonly use encrypted channels). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating potential remote access by threat actors for espionage or data exfiltration. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating payload executed only when the victim’s system matched a predefined domain (indicates host reconnaissance). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (10%), supported by evidence indicating no ransomware strain identified (low confidence; included for completeness) and Endpoint Denial of Service: Application Exhaustion Flood (T1499.004) with lower confidence (20%), supported by evidence indicating no downtime reported (speculative; included due to GRU’s historical use of disruptive tactics). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Sources & References