Comparison Overview
Mobileye

Mobileye
1 Shlomo HaLevi, West Jerusalem, Jerusalem District, IL
Last Update: 28/03/2026
Mobileye is leading the mobility revolution with its autonomous-driving and driver-assist technologies, harnessing world-renowned expertise in computer vision, machine learning, mapping, and data analysis. Our technology enables self-driving vehicles and mobility sol...

Volvo Group
Gropegårdsgatan 2, Göteborg, SE, 417 15
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The Volvo Group is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of trucks, buses, construction equipment and marine and industrial engines. The Group also provides complete solutions for financing and service. The Volvo Group, with its headquarters in Gothenburg, employs ab...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Mobileye







Volvo Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mobileye in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Volvo Group has 5.66% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Mobileye (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mobileye cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Volvo Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Volvo Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Mobileye

Volvo Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.