Comparison Overview
Marcus & Millichap Texas

Marcus & Millichap Texas
5001 Spring Valley Road Suite 100W, Dallas, 75244, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Marcus & Millichap’s team of Texas-based offices specialize in the brokerage of all types of commercial real estate products, including apartments, retail, office, industrial, self-storage, seniors housing, hospitality, single-tenant net leased, land, manufactured home ...

Compass
110 Fifth Avenue, New York, 10011, US
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Compass is a real estate technology company with a powerful end-to-end platform that supports the entire buying and selling workflow. We deliver an incomparable experience to both agents and their clients all in service of the Compass mission: to help everyone find thei...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Marcus & Millichap Texas







Compass






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Marcus & Millichap Texas in 2026.
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Compass in 2026.
Incident History - Marcus & Millichap Texas (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Marcus & Millichap Texas cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Compass (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Compass cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Marcus & Millichap Texas

Compass
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.