Comparison Overview
MINI Calgary

MINI Calgary
7699 110 Ave NW, Calgary, Alberta, T3R 1R8, CA
Last Update: 14/02/2026
MINI Calgary has been proudly serving the Calgary, Alberta community since 2005 as a premier MINI Dealership specialising in New & Used MINI Vehicle Sales, Service and Parts. Dedicated to helping you find the perfect vehicle for you; whether it is new, pre-owned model,...

Iveco Group
Via Puglia 35, Torino, 10156, IT
Last Update: 21/09/2026
Iveco Group N.V. (MI: IVG) is the home of unique people and brands that power your business and mission to advance a more sustainable society. The seven brands are each a major force in its specific business: IVECO, a pioneering commercial vehicles brand that designs, m...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

MINI Calgary







Iveco Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MINI Calgary in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Iveco Group in 2026.
Incident History - MINI Calgary (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MINI Calgary cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Iveco Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Iveco Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

MINI Calgary

Iveco Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.