Comparison Overview
Mineral Technologies

Mineral Technologies
11 Elysium Road, Carrara, Gold Coast, Queensland, AU, 4211
Last Update: 28/01/2026
We understand that minerals matter more than ever, and how we extract and process them matters even more. The world’s growing demand for resources requires smarter, more sustainable mining solutions, and that’s exactly what we deliver. With over 80 years of expertise,...

BHP
171 Collins Street, Melbourne, 3000, AU
Last Update: 04/06/2026
We are supplying the resources the world needs to help build a better, clearer future. Copper for renewable energy. Potash for sustainable farming. Iron ore and metallurgical coal for the steel needed for global infrastructure and the energy transition. #FutureIsClear ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Mineral Technologies







BHP






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Mining Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mineral Technologies in 2026.
Incidents vs Mining Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BHP in 2026.
Incident History - Mineral Technologies (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mineral Technologies cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - BHP (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BHP cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Mineral Technologies

BHP
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
GNU Savannah Administration Savane through 3.17 uses untrusted data as part of authorization.
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n113
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n123
- https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48605220
- https://www.fsf.org/news/statement-regarding-gnu-savannah-security-reports
- https://www.hacktron.ai
- https://www.mallory.ai/stories/019ee445-bdd4-7775-93b5-a8faaf5c2eb7
AVideo TopMenu plugin through version 26.0 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in menu item rendering due to missing output encoding of icon classes, URLs, and text labels. Attackers can inject malicious JavaScript through unescaped menu item fields that execute for all site visitors, potentially stealing session cookies or performing unauthorized actions.
AVideo through version 25.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the decryptMessage.json.php endpoint that allows unauthenticated users to decrypt PGP messages. Remote attackers can submit private keys, ciphertext, and passphrases to perform server-side decryption without credentials, exposing key material to logs and enabling resource exhaustion attacks.
AVideo through 29.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Meet plugin's uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint that derives the target users_id from the uploaded filename without verification. An attacker with knowledge of the Meet shared secret can craft a malicious file upload with a filename containing an arbitrary users_id to invoke passwordless User->login() and establish an authenticated session as any user including admin. Attackers can obtain the Meet shared secret through path-traversal vulnerabilities or timing attacks against checkToken.json.php, then POST a crafted file to uploadRecordedVideo.json.php with a filename like '1-anything.mp4' to hijack admin sessions and gain full account takeover.
AVideo through version 27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php that allows authenticated administrators to read arbitrary URLs via the statsURL parameter, which lacks isSSRFSafeURL() validation and accepts requests to private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints. Attackers can exploit this by crafting requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints like 169.254.169.254, and localhost to retrieve sensitive information including IAM credentials, internal service responses, and network configuration details.