Comparison Overview
Mindera - Portugal

Mindera - Portugal
Rua Gonçalo Cristóvão, 347, Porto, 4000-270, PT
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We are a global consulting and engineering company with 1100+ people, delivering technology solutions across 9 locations — from Brazil to Australia. We work across diverse industries, from Fintech to the Public Sector, offering services in Data, AI, Mobile, and more. Y...

Juniper Networks
1133 Innovation Way, Sunnyvale, CA, US, 94089
Last Update: 10/04/2026
Juniper Networks is leading the revolution in networking, making it one of the most exciting technology companies in Silicon Valley today. Since being founded by Pradeep Sindhu, Dennis Ferguson, and Bjorn Liencres nearly 20 years ago, Juniper’s sole mission has been to ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Mindera - Portugal







Juniper Networks






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mindera - Portugal in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
Juniper Networks has 183.02% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Mindera - Portugal (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mindera - Portugal cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Juniper Networks (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Juniper Networks cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Mindera - Portugal

Juniper Networks
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.